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Two decades ago, scholars began studying the history of American mas-
culinity, for reasons that are now fairly clear. Gender roles in American society 
changed rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, in response both to feminist de-
mands for gender equality and to changing economic incentives for women to 
enter the wage labor force. Disgruntled American men (mostly white) created a 
“men’s movement” in the 1990s, producing an array of groups that ranged from 
divorce reformers who decried the supposedly anti-male bias of family courts, 
to mytho-poetic men’s groups who retreated to the woods to reclaim their viril-
ity, to Promise Keepers who vowed to renew their commitment to conservative 
Christian ideals of responsible fatherhood and marital fidelity. The phenomenon 
cried out for a historical explanation. The answer scholars provided was that man-
hood was a historically variable experience, rather than a timeless phenomenon. 
The majority of historians who have looked at the history of American man-
hood emphasize that male identities are culturally constructed, and thus highly 
variable. Maleness does not represent some biological essence or transcendent 
subjectivity. As Michael Kimmel puts it, “Manhood is neither static nor timeless. 
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. . . [It] does not bubble up to consciousness from our biological constitution . . . 
Manhood means different things at different times to different people.”1 The core 
methodological assumption in this line of scholarship, namely that masculinity is 
a cultural construction, builds upon concepts in feminist scholarship and cultural 
theory and has been reinforced by scholarly practices which encourage the study 
of discrete periods and groups. Both the assumption and the practice have encour-
aged scholars to focus on the subjective construction of male identity in different 
periods, regions, and especially, social classes, in effect offering snapshots of 
particular manhoods as they intersect with events at particular moments in time. 
It has become a truism that scholars are describing diverse masculinities, rather 
than looking for larger patterns in male identity in general.
While this focus on particularity has produced some enormously significant 
scholarship, particularly for the study of sexuality, it had tended to divert atten-
tion from inquiries that might compare patterns of male behavior across societies 
and time periods. One especially salient question for the history of manhood 
emerges from recent scholarship on long-term changes in patterns of violent 
and aggressive behavior, which is mostly rooted in social history and criminol-
ogy, rather than cultural theory. Scholars who study patterns of violence tend 
to approach male aggression as a phenomenon present in all or most societies, 
as well as a problem that societies must find ways to deal with. Although their 
data by no means suggests that all men are aggressive, it shows that in societies 
with disruptive levels of interpersonal violence, those acts of violence are far 
more likely to be committed by men than by women. Cultural constructions of 
manhood are likely one factor that influence men’s inclinations to act aggres-
sively in particular situations, although they are not the only factor. Other types 
of male experience and behavior, too, might usefully be compared across time 
and place. The two books under review here suggest that a more active attention 
to commonality as well as difference could be fruitful. 
Joshua Greenberg, Advocating the Man: Masculinity, Organized Labor, and 
the Household in New York, 1800-1840 (New York, 2008), frames his study of 
early nineteenth-century New York City workingmen in the context of existing 
scholarship on both the history of manhood and labor history. American historians 
have typically argued that dominant norms of manhood in eighteenth century 
America were patriarchal, but that the development of a wage labor system chal-
lenged manhood norms across classes. As men ceased to be involved in training 
their sons or apprentices, women gained authority within the family, and norms 
of manhood for middle class men (historians have argued) came to center on 
the qualities that made them successful businessmen. An older ideal of men as 
masters of households was supplanted by a newer ideal of men as breadwinners.2 
Complicating this picture, a few recent historians have questioned the assumption 
that white men in nineteenth century America dissociated themselves from the 
“separate sphere” of women and children and found instead that white middle 
class men continued to invest considerable time and energy to fulfilling their 
domestic roles.3 However scholars have usually suggested that white working- 
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class men resisted the hegemony of middle-class values, and escaped to the 
taverns and the streets where they created autonomous masculine subcultures. 
Instead of defining themselves as breadwinners, they expressed their manhood by 
participating in a boisterous, democratic public culture organized around fight-
ing, drinking, and adherence to an ethos that valued male camaraderie, physical 
courage, and personal honor. 4
Greenberg’s study of organized workingmen in New York City before 1840 
suggests that white American men experiencing the market revolution may in 
fact have had more in common than historians have acknowledged. He finds that 
the white workingmen who joined labor unions were usually married house-
hold heads rather than bachelors, and that the priorities of the labor movement 
reflected the members’ desires to meet their family obligations, rather than to 
escape from them. Rather than rejecting the middle-class focus on breadwinning 
and responsible fatherhood, labor unions and the political parties they created 
shaped their agenda around their members’ family concerns. 
Greenberg finds that as trade union men faced the prospect that they would 
be permanent wage earners rather than becoming masters over their own shops, 
they sought to change their employment conditions so that they could continue 
to be family breadwinners. They focused on winning a “family wage” that would 
allow them to support their wives and children, as well as benefits that would 
offer security to their wives and children if they became ill, got injured, or died. 
Organized men opposed child labor, not only because they feared competition 
from children’s low wages but also because they feared that boys would receive 
inadequate training for adulthood under the new wage labor system. They cham-
pioned the ten-hour day, not so much to gain time for leisure as to gain time to 
spend with their families. 
The same sorts of priorities, Greenberg argues, were reflected in the agendas 
of the Working Men’s Party (formed in 1829) and the Equal Rights Party (formed 
in 1837). Different factions within the WMP divided over the issue of how best 
to provide for the welfare of children (especially boys). Thomas Skidmore’s 
agrarian plan proposed to abolish inheritance and redistribute property so that all 
male children would have a guarantee of receiving property of their own when 
they reached adulthood. Robert Dale Owen proposed a state guardianship system 
of public education so that all children would receive an equal education. Both 
of these proposals were too radical for more moderate members of the WMP, 
who favored reforms that would leave fathers in charge of educating and provid-
ing for their own children. But even the moderates favored universal, publicly 
funded education so that all children would receive an education now that they 
could no longer count on receiving workplace training in a craft. Similarly the 
Equal Rights Party, or the Loco Focos, responded to threats to their members’ 
household-based masculine identities. They praised married life, urged members 
to provide moral guidance to their families, and criticized banks’ economic poli-
cies because they eroded workingmen’s ability to provide for their dependents.
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Like other scholarship that examines the particularity of masculine identities, 
Greenberg’s study is narrowly framed, and as applied to the men he examines, 
his argument is quite credible. British and Anglo-American societies in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were patriarchal. White men in these 
societies had for centuries described ideal manhood in terms of men’s success-
ful fulfillment of their roles as fathers and masters of households. Many adult 
men in the early modern world derived considerable emotional satisfaction from 
their domestic relationships, not least because they received so much deference 
from their wives, children, apprentices, and servants. It seems entirely plausible 
that married New York City workingmen would seek to retain the respect of 
their wives and adolescent children and to preserve their image of themselves 
as benevolent paterfamilias by trying to strengthen their roles as the primary 
breadwinners of their families.
Though I am convinced by Greenberg’s finding that organized workingmen 
in New York City before 1840 sincerely wanted to be good fathers and good 
providers, I wish he had told us more about how these men’s aspirations translated 
into actual behavior. Since he frames this study as a history of the early New 
York City labor movement, it makes sense for him to focus on the rhetoric and 
priorities of labor leaders. But understanding the construction of their identities 
as men requires us to understand not only their hopes and ideals but also to see 
how they dealt with their disappointments and frustrations. How did these work-
ingmen actually behave at home as their wages declined and their work became 
less secure? How did their changing working conditions affect the dynamics of 
their domestic lives? Did they spend more time with their families, or did they 
just think they should? How did they react if wives or children questioned their 
competence as family providers? Given existing sources, these questions may 
be difficult to answer. Still, Christine Stansell provided a superb template back 
in 1986 for how a historian might examine workingmen’s actual domestic lives.5 
Using New York City municipal court records she found that when husbands’ 
domestic authority was eroded by declining wages and decreasing job security, 
they not infrequently responded by battering their wives. Court records provide 
revealing evidence about workingmen’s actual domestic behavior, and might 
produce a more complex picture of how these men’s domestic aspirations inter-
sected with other unstated assumptions about manhood.
Richard Stott’s Jolly Fellows: Male Milieus in Nineteenth Century America 
(Baltimore, 2009) is a study not of a discrete group of men in a particular time 
and place, but rather a study of patterns of white male behavior throughout the 
United States over more than a century. His book confronts the phenomenon 
of male aggression and violence head on. Stott’s book begins with a look at the 
rowdy early nineteenth-century culture of all-male sociability (which he calls 
“jolly fellowship”) with its norms of heavy drinking, fighting, and gambling, and 
then examines how that culture changed over the next hundred years. Stott has 
long been interested in studying men who engaged in violent and unruly behavior, 
but his earlier work presented disorderly and aggressive male behavior (at least 
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in mid-nineteenth-century New York City) as an expression of working class 
cultural consciousness. His approach in this new book is different. Stott suggests 
that rough, aggressive male behavior was expected in the context of all-male 
sociability both in early modern European and Anglo-American societies, but 
that a “moral revolution” made such traditional forms of behavior increasingly 
disreputable during the nineteenth century. 
The concept of a “moral revolution” or a ‘“revolution in manners” owes 
much to the sociologist Norbert Elias, who suggested that European society went 
through a “civilizing process” during the early modern period that changed the 
structure of human personalities. People became less impulsive, more restrained, 
and more capable of rational planning. Although Elias’s theory has been chal-
lenged on many fronts, it has gotten considerable empirical support from social 
historians who have traced homicide rates on both sides of the Atlantic over the 
longue durée. These historians have found that men in late medieval Europe were 
considerably more likely to kill each other, mostly in tavern brawls or local fights, 
than were men in the late nineteenth or twentieth centuries in either Europe or the 
United States. (To underline this point, Stott observes that the homicide rate in 
twenty-first century America, which is one of the highest in the modern western 
world, is still lower than the homicide rate in the Anglo-American colonies dur-
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.)6
Stott is less interested in tracing the long history of this revolution in manners 
than in looking at its consequences for the experiences and identities of white 
men in nineteenth century America. The incidence of drinking, rowdy behavior, 
and violence among most American men declined dramatically between 1800 
and 1850, a development for which Stott offers a multi-faceted explanation. 
The development of capitalism improved the pay-off for self-controlled, sober, 
industrious behavior, so men in the 1820s and 1830s began to change their work 
habits, their agricultural practices, and their comportment. The Great Awakening 
inspired greater religiosity, and produced moral reform movements that increased 
social sanctions against drinking, swearing, Sabbath breaking, and fighting. 
Women pressured men to stop drinking and get on the straight and narrow. By 
the 1840s, men were becoming reformed, and the traditional ethos of jolly fel-
lowship was being marginalized.
Although most men found ways to restrain their aggressive impulses, the 
data on homicides shows that male violence and fighting persisted and in fact 
grew to extremely high levels in a few sections of the United States, especially 
after 1850. Stott devotes the last two-thirds of his book to examining the ways in 
which subcultures of male violence and rowdiness developed in particular regions, 
and how they were imagined over the next 60 years. Disorderly male behavior 
flourished in particular locales, or what Stott calls “moral districts”: disreputable 
urban neighborhoods such as the Bowery in New York City, California Gold 
Rush mining camps, frontier settlements in Alabama and Mississippi, logging 
towns in the northwest, and steamboats on the Mississippi. A subterranean world 
of “sporting men,” mostly made up of gamblers and professional prizefighters, 
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emerged in New York City in the 1840s. The Wild West became notorious for 
its toleration of gambling, drinking, and fighting. 
Although these subcultures were increasingly marginal, respectable men 
continued to be drawn to them, if only as spectators and consumers. Nineteenth 
century male readers were avidly interested in stories about tricksters, fighters, 
gamblers, and strong men who tormented the weak. Male audiences flocked to 
theaters to watch professional boxers pummel each other, and fighters became 
major celebrities.
One of the most interesting developments in the development of modern 
American ideologies of manhood occurred at the end of the nineteenth century, 
with the emergence of an almost paranoid concern that American men were 
becoming effeminate. In response, American culture at the turn of the century 
became increasingly masculinized. Middle-class men threw themselves into 
activities that promised to restore their manhood, or escaped into fantasies of 
about rugged, unrestrained masculine life. Bodybuilding, western dude ranches, 
and organized sports were suddenly all the rage. So were literary heroes like 
Owen Wister’s cowboys, Edward Burroughs’s Tarzan the Ape Man, and Zane 
Grey’s gunmen—all men who had repudiated bourgeois American conventions 
and embraced a savage, primitive masculinity. 
Historians have offered various explanations for this sudden obsession with 
sports and virile heroes in American popular and literary culture: middle-class 
men were demoralized by the entry of women into colleges and corporate of-
fices, the growing bureaucratization of corporate work, and the sudden influx of 
immigrants into American cities; a society shifting towards mass consumption 
needed to offer entertainments in order to stimulate consumer desires.7 Stott’s 
explanation is simpler. The moral reform movement of the previous century 
had finally peaked. American men had so fully succeeded in sublimating their 
aggressive impulses that they needed to find activities that would allow them to 
let off a little steam, or at least to fantasize about doing so. 
Stott’s attempt to incorporate the data on the dramatic long-term decline in 
homicide rates and violence in American society over the past 200 years into the 
history of manhood is an important one, and he has produced a smart, provoca-
tive book. It might have been a better book if he had thought more about how 
white women figured in these white men’s worlds, both in producing the decline 
in aggressive behavior and provoking the anxieties or resentments that led some 
of them to retreat into all-male milieus, if only for a short period in their lives. 
But the book does make a significant contribution, for in approaching violence 
and aggression as common features of male experience, he has shed light on a 
broadly diverse range of experiences among white men in different regions of 
the United States and managed to offer a coherent explanation for patterns of 
change over time. 
One question raised by these two books is how to square their findings with 
one another. Did American men who aspired to be responsible fathers and moral 
guides to their households actually spend their time drinking and fighting with 
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other jolly fellows? Stott seems to have abandoned class as the central analyti-
cal category here; he is not suggesting that middle-class men became sober and 
working-class men ran wild. Might age have been a factor? Regions with high 
homicide rates tended to be regions with high concentrations of bachelors, where 
family controls were weak. But as Stott makes clear, some famous nineteenth- 
century sporting men were married with children.
Reconciling evidence about aspirational norms of manhood with evidence 
about men’s aggressive, disorderly, and sometimes violent behavior is a challenge 
that historians of American manhood have not adequately confronted. Men’s 
behavior in certain kinds of all-male milieus, as Stott suggests, seems to show 
that there was a widespread expectation before 1830 or so that men should be 
ready to engage in fights under certain kinds of circumstances, and that in certain 
parts of the country, this expectation persisted. But official pronouncements about 
manhood rarely valorized male violence. Throughout the eighteenth century, in 
the South as much in New England, the ideal male was described as moderate, 
rational, responsible, and peaceable. Young men and men of color were often 
described as unruly and rebellious, but these were not admired traits. 
Perhaps the official pronouncements about ideal men as responsible patri-
archs and the high levels of violent behavior can both be understood as products of 
a particular system of social control, a system that during the nineteenth-century 
was being gradually replaced. In eighteenth and early nineteenth century British 
North America, the main institution for social control was still the patriarchal 
family. Male household heads could (and did) punish disobedient sons, male ser-
vants, and slaves, many of whom were in their teens or early twenties, the ages at 
which men are most likely to engage in disorderly behavior. A patriarchal system 
of social control, while coercive, was never particularly effective in controlling 
male aggression, in part because the patriarchs themselves were expected to use 
physical force to maintain order in their households. Meanwhile other kinds of 
law enforcement mechanisms in the early United States were weak. Laws and 
moral norms had traditionally been enforced by groups of ordinary citizens (usu-
ally male), often led by their social “betters.” Adult men were expected to know 
how to take charge and to be physically intimidating, and the line between force 
used to “teach somebody a lesson” and illegitimate force was not sharply drawn. 
During the nineteenth century, male gender norms may not have changed as 
dramatically as many historians have suggested. Moral advice literature, at least, 
suggests that adult men were still expected to behave rationally, responsibly, and 
peaceably, though now refinement and sympathy were added to the general traits 
expected of the ideal man, and expectations that men should be self-controlled 
do appear to have become more extreme. As studies like Greenberg’s suggest, 
most men probably still aspired to be responsible fathers. However, once north-
ern society came to be organized around wage labor, married white men in the 
North had few occasions to engage in aggressive behavior, except in wartime. 
Young, unmarried men were now freer from patriarchal supervision, but as Stott 
astutely observes, incentives for self-control and sobriety were growing. How-
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ever these incentives were not equally distributed. The male subculture created 
in New York’s Bowery neighborhood before the Civil War, as several historians 
have pointed out, was largely a subculture created by young unmarried urban 
workingmen whose opportunities for upward mobility as artisans were declining. 
They had fewer reasons to sublimate their aggressions than did young men with 
better economic prospects. Southern slaveholders, too, were still expected to use 
physical force and intimidation to control their labor force. It is not coincidental 
that a culture of dueling and brawling lasted longer in regions where the labor 
system was based upon slavery. 
A serious synthesis of historians’ findings on the social construction of 
masculinity and their findings on patterns of male aggression in America’s past 
is long overdue. Stott’s book is a wonderful starting point, and suggests a range 
of questions that might be asked. What roles did American women play in the 
so-called reformation of manners? Did the frequency of male violence towards 
women decline at the same pace as did fighting and violence between males? How 
did the reformation of manners, and the marginalization of traditional forms of 
sociability, affect the construction of gender in communities of people of color? 
How was the use of violence in public related to conceptions of citizenship? 
Have associations between manhood and violence changed during times of war, 
especially during the twentieth century when the state increasingly deployed male 
aggression in the service of its military objectives? Have associations between 
white masculinity and aggression (I am thinking here of the rise in the support 
for gun ownership since the 1960s) changed in response to women’s growing 
participation in the wage workforce and in American public life? There is a rich 
vein of potential insights here, waiting to be mined.
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